LLG kickass. AC3-EVO thepiratebay HFGT rarbg. HMKV kickass. HMKV x. HSCB thepiratebay Hon3y kickass. Hon3y thepiratebay HFGT thepiratebay AM] kickass. HFGT kickass. HSCB kickass. ENG-Bymonello78 x. Cue , Lossless] underver. Mike Oldfield - New Times nnmclub.
Bad Religion - New Maps of Hell nnmclub. GTA New manual work[rus-eng] P nnmclub. The RP is responsible for authenticating the source the verifier and for confirming the integrity of the assertion.
When the verifier passes the assertion through the subscriber, the verifier must protect the integrity of the assertion in such a way that it cannot be modified. However, if the verifier and the RP communicate directly, a protected session may be used to preserve the integrity of the assertion. An RP relies on results of an authentication protocol to establish confidence in the identity or attributes of a subscriber for the purpose of conducting an online transaction.
The verifier and the RP may be the same entity, or they may be separate entities. If they are separate entities, the RP normally receives an assertion from the verifier. The RP ensures that the assertion came from a verifier trusted by the RP. The RP also processes any additional information in the assertion, such as personal attributes or expiration times.
This does not establish additional risk management processes for agencies. It is quite possible that an agency can deliver the most effective set of identity services by assessing the risk and impacts of failures for each individual component of digital authentication, rather than as a single, all-encompassing LOA. To this end, these guidelines recognize that an authentication error is not a singleton that drives all requirements. From the perspective of an identity proofing failure, there are two dimensions of potential failure:.
As such, agencies SHALL assess the risk of proofing, authentication, and federation errors separately to determine the required assurance level for each transaction. Section 5. Risk assessments determine the extent to which risk must be mitigated by the identity proofing, authentication, and federation processes. These determinations drive the relevant choices of applicable technologies and mitigation strategies, rather than the desire for any given technology driving risk determinations.
See Section 5. A summary of each of the identity, authenticator, and federation assurance levels is provided below. Authentication, proofing, and federation errors with potentially worse consequences require higher levels of assurance.
Business process, policy, and technology may help reduce risk. Required assurance levels for digital transactions are determined by assessing the potential impact of each of the above categories using the potential impact values described in Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS [FIPS ].
The assurance level determination is only based on transactions that are part of a digital system. An online transaction may not be equivalent to a complete business process that requires offline processing, or online processing in a completely segmented system.
In selecting the appropriate assurance levels, the agency should assess the risk associated with online transactions they are offering via the digital service, not the entire business process associated with the provided benefit or service.
For example, in an online survey, personal information may be collected, but it is never made available online to the submitter after the information is saved. In this instance, it is important for the information to be carefully protected in backend systems, but there is no reason to identity proof or even authenticate the user providing the information for the purposes of their own access to the system or its associated benefits.
The online transaction is solely a submission of the data. The entire business process may require a significant amount of data validation, without ever needing to know if the correct person submitted the information. In this scenario, there is no need for any identity proofing nor authentication. However, the identity proofing requirements remain unclear. Identity proofing is not required to complete the digital portion of the transaction successfully.
Identity proofing the submitter would create more risk than required in the online system as excess personal information would be collected when no such information is needed for the portion of the hiring process served by the digital job application portal and may reduce usability.
Therefore, the most appropriate IAL selection would be 1. There is no need to identity proof the user to successfully complete the online transaction.
This decision for the online portal itself is independent of a seemingly obvious identity proofing requirement for the entire business process, lest a job be offered to a fraudulent applicant. This section defines the potential impacts for each category of harm. Note: If an error in the identity system causes no measurable consequences for a category, there is no impact.
The SP suite specifies baseline requirements for digital identity services based on assurance level. Agencies MAY determine alternatives to the NIST-recommended guidance, for the assessed xALs, based on their mission, risk tolerance, existing business processes, special considerations for certain populations, availability of data that provides similar mitigations to those described in this suite, or due to other capabilities that are unique to the agency.
Agencies SHALL demonstrate comparability of any chosen alternative, to include any compensating controls, when the complete set of applicable SP requirements is not implemented. The agency SHALL implement procedures to document both the justification for any departure from normative requirements and detail the compensating control s employed. This guidance addresses only those risks associated with authentication and identity proofing errors.
In some instances, the user population will be unaffected, yet in others, the CSP will require users undergo a transitional activity. For example, CSPs may request users — upon initial logon since last revision — to supply additional proofing evidence to adhere to new IAL requirements. The following considerations serve only as a guide to agencies when considering the impacts of requirements changes:.
The guidance does not prescribe that any migration needs to occur, only that it be considered as revisions are released. It is up to the CSP and RP, based on their risk tolerance and mission, to determine the best approach.
The risk assessment results are the primary factor in selecting the most appropriate levels. This section details how to apply the results of the risk assessment with additional factors unrelated to risk to determine the most advantageous xAL selection.
First, compare the risk assessment impact profile to the impact profiles associated with each assurance level, as shown in Table below. To determine the required assurance level, find the lowest level whose impact profile meets or exceeds the potential impact for every category analyzed in the risk assessment.
In analyzing risks, the agency SHALL consider all of the expected direct and indirect results of an authentication failure, including the possibility that there will be more than one failure, or harms to more than one person or organization. The agency SHOULD consider the context and the nature of the persons or entities affected to decide the relative significance of these harms. Over time, the meaning of these terms will become more definite as agencies gain practical experience with these issues.
The analysis of harms to agency programs or other public interests depends strongly on the context; the agency SHOULD consider these issues with care. In the above example, there may be no need for the agency system to know the actual identity of the user. This allows the user of the health tracker system to be pseudonymous. Note: An agency can accept a higher assurance level than those required in the table above.
For example, in a federated transaction, an agency can accept an IAL3 identity if their application is assessed at IAL2. The same holds true for authenticators: stronger authenticators can be used at RPs that have lower authenticator requirements. However, RPs will have to ensure that this only occurs in federated scenarios with appropriate privacy protections by the CSP such that only attributes that have been requested by the RP and authorized by the subscriber are provided to the RP and that excessive personal information does not leak from the credential or an assertion.
See the privacy considerations in SP C for more details. The only difference between these applications is the amount of proofing required, which may not impact the security and privacy of each application.
That said, if an agency incorrectly determines the xAL, security and privacy could very well be impacted. The IAL decision tree in Figure combines the results from the risk assessment with additional considerations related to identity proofing services to allow agencies to select the most appropriate identity proofing requirements for their digital service offering.
The IAL selection does not mean the digital service provider will need to perform the proofing themselves. More information on whether an agency can federate is provided in Section 7. While not a function of IAL selection, certain proofing processes may be more appropriate for some demographics than others. Agencies will benefit as this type of analysis ensures the greatest opportunity for their constituents to be proofed successfully. The AAL decision tree in Figure combines the results from the risk assessment with additional considerations related to authentication to allow agencies to select the most appropriate authentication requirements for their digital service offering.
The AAL selection does not mean the digital service provider will need to issue authenticators themselves. More information on whether the agency can federate is provided in Section 7. The FAL decision tree in Figure combines the results from the risk assessment with additional considerations related to federation to allow agencies to select the most appropriate requirements for their digital service offering.
All FALs require assertions to have a baseline of protections, including signatures, expirations, audience restrictions, and others enumerated in SP C. When taken together, these measures make it so that assertions cannot be created or modified by an unauthorized party, and that an RP will not accept an assertion created for a different system.
This guideline introduces a model where individual xALs can be selected without requiring parity to each other. While options exist to select varying xALs for a system, in many instances the same level will be chosen for all xALs. The ability to combine varying xALs offers significant flexibility to agencies, but not all combinations are possible due to the nature of the data collected from an individual and the authenticators to protect that data.
Note: Per Executive Order [EO ] , the release of personal data requires protection with MFA, even if the personal data is self-asserted and not validated. When the transaction does not make personal data accessible, authentication may occur at AAL1, although providing an option for the user to choose stronger authentication is recommended. In addition, it may be possible at IAL1 to self-assert information that is not personal, in which case AAL1 is acceptable.
This guideline and its companion volumes are agnostic to the authentication and identity proofing architecture an agency selects. However, there are scenarios an agency may encounter that make identity federation potentially more efficient and effective than establishing identity services local to the agency or individual applications. The following list details scenarios where, if any apply, the agency may consider federation a viable option.
This list does not take into consideration any economic benefits or weaknesses of federation vs. The following publications may be of particular interest to those implementing systems of applications requiring digital authentication.
A wide variety of terms is used in the realm of authentication. Many of these terms lack a single, consistent definition, warranting careful attention to how the terms are defined here. Examples of active attacks include man-in-the-middle MitM , impersonation, and session hijacking. The validated and verified location physical or digital where an individual can receive communications using approved mechanisms.
A statement from a verifier to an RP that contains information about a subscriber. Assertions may also contain verified attributes. A data object, created in conjunction with an assertion, that identifies the verifier and includes a pointer to the full assertion held by the verifier.
Two related keys, comprised of a public key and a private key, that are used to perform complementary operations such as encryption and decryption or signature verification and generation. A packaged set of attributes, usually contained within an assertion. Attribute bundles offer RPs a simple way to retrieve the most relevant attributes they need from IdPs. A statement asserting a property of a subscriber without necessarily containing identity information, independent of format.
A complete statement asserting a property of a subscriber, independent of format. An encrypted communication channel that uses approved cryptography where the connection initiator client has authenticated the recipient server.
Authenticated protected channels provide confidentiality and MitM protection and are frequently used in the user authentication process. Transport Layer Security TLS [BCP ] is an example of an authenticated protected channel where the certificate presented by the recipient is verified by the initiator. Unless otherwise specified, authenticated protected channels do not require the server to authenticate the client.
Authentication of the server is often accomplished through a certificate chain leading to a trusted root rather than individually with each server.
The three types of authentication factors are something you know , something you have , and something you are. Every authenticator has one or more authentication factors. Some authenticators e. A defined sequence of messages between a claimant and a verifier that demonstrates that the claimant has possession and control of one or more valid authenticators to establish their identity, and, optionally, demonstrates that the claimant is communicating with the intended verifier.
An exchange of messages between a claimant and a verifier that results in authentication or authentication failure between the two parties. A generic term for any secret value that an attacker could use to impersonate the subscriber in an authentication protocol.
These are further divided into short-term authentication secrets , which are only useful to an attacker for a limited period of time, and long-term authentication secrets , which allow an attacker to impersonate the subscriber until they are manually reset. The authenticator secret is the canonical example of a long-term authentication secret, while the authenticator output, if it is different from the authenticator secret, is usually a short-term authentication secret.
In previous editions of SP , this was referred to as a token. The output value generated by an authenticator. The ability to generate valid authenticator outputs on demand proves that the claimant possesses and controls the authenticator. Protocol messages sent to the verifier are dependent upon the authenticator output, but they may or may not explicitly contain it. A category of authenticators with common characteristics.
Some authenticator types provide one authentication factor, others provide two. An entity that has access to, or verified copies of, accurate information from an issuing source such that a CSP can confirm the validity of the identity evidence supplied by an applicant during identity proofing. An issuing source may also be an authoritative source. Often, authoritative sources are determined by a policy decision of the agency or CSP before they can be used in the identity proofing validation phase.
This credential can be separate from the assertion provided by the federation protocol e. Communication between two systems that relies on a direct connection allowing for standard protocol-level proxies , without using redirects through an intermediary such as a browser. This can be accomplished using HTTP requests and responses. The assertion a party presents as proof of identity, where possession of the assertion itself is sufficient proof of identity for the assertion bearer.
An authentication protocol where the verifier sends the claimant a challenge usually a random value or nonce that the claimant combines with a secret such as by hashing the challenge and a shared secret together, or by applying a private key operation to the challenge to generate a response that is sent to the verifier.
The verifier can independently verify the response generated by the claimant such as by re-computing the hash of the challenge and the shared secret and comparing to the response, or performing a public key operation on the response and establish that the claimant possesses and controls the secret. The physical location asserted by a subject where they can be reached. For example, a person with a foreign passport living in the U. An interactive feature added to web forms to distinguish whether a human or automated agent is using the form.
Typically, it requires entering text corresponding to a distorted image or a sound stream. An object or data structure that authoritatively binds an identity - via an identifier or identifiers - and optionally additional attributes, to at least one authenticator possessed and controlled by a subscriber.
A trusted entity that issues or registers subscriber authenticators and issues electronic credentials to subscribers. A CSP may be an independent third party or issue credentials for its own use.
For example, if a bank website is vulnerable to a CSRF attack, it may be possible for a subscriber to unintentionally authorize a large money transfer, merely by viewing a malicious link in a webmail message while a connection to the bank is open in another browser window. A vulnerability that allows attackers to inject malicious code into an otherwise benign website.
These scripts acquire the permissions of scripts generated by the target website and can therefore compromise the confidentiality and integrity of data transfers between the website and client. Nice Dreams Charred Walls of the Damned. Quantum Catastrophe Brain Drill. Heliocentric The Ocean. Heliocentric Instrumental The Ocean.
All Empires Fall Primordial. Everlong Evergreen Terrace. La Raza Armored Saint. Parallels Expanded Edition Fates Warning. Disciples of the Unseen Aeternam. Graveyard Classics 3 Six Feet Under. Revisions 3. Almost Home Evergreen Terrace. Double Brutal Austrian Death Machine.
Deflorate The Black Dahlia Murder. Warsaw Rising Hail of Bullets. Evil Mercyful Fate. Ruination Job for a Cowboy. Carving Out the Eyes of God Goatwhore. Omnicide - Creation Unleashed Neaera. Passiondale God Dethroned. Bible of the Beast Powerwolf. Evisceration Plague Cannibal Corpse.
The Harvest Floor Cattle Decapitation. Death Rituals Six Feet Under. Survival Born from Pain. The March Unearth. Twilight of the Thunder God Amon Amarth. Among Beggars and Thieves Falconer. Total Brutal Austrian Death Machine. This Is Exile Whitechapel.
Misanthropy Pure Shai Hulud. Alive From The Apocalypse Unearth. Fury and Flames Hate Eternal. The End Is Begun 3. Apocalyptic Feasting Brain Drill. Precambrian The Ocean. To the Nameless Dead Primordial. Appointment with Death Lizzy Borden. Nocturnal The Black Dahlia Murder.
Structures of Death Fleshcrawl. Armamentarium Neaera. Rise to Dominate Aeon. Satan's Soldiers Syndicate Desaster. The Somatic Defilement Whitechapel. Prey for Eyes The Red Chord. Wolfbiker Evergreen Terrace. Genesis Job for a Cowboy. Commandment Six Feet Under. Lupus Dei Powerwolf. Vile Special Edition Cannibal Corpse.
War Born from Pain. Northwind Falconer. A Haunting Curse Goatwhore. Karma Cattle Decapitation. Doom Job for a Cowboy. Let the Tempest Come Neaera. Kill Cannibal Corpse. Aeolian The Ocean. Those Once Loyal Bolt Thrower. Wake Pig 3. Miasma The Black Dahlia Murder.
Clients The Red Chord. Grime Vs. Grandeur Falconer. In Love with the End Born from Pain. The Rising Tide of Oblivion Neaera. Return in Bloodred Powerwolf. The Gathering Wilderness Primordial. Deadly Lullabyes Live King Diamond. Fate Of Norns Amon Amarth. Crowned Unholy The Crown. Humanure Cattle Decapitation. The Oncoming Storm Unearth. Made of Flesh Fleshcrawl. The Wretched Spawn Cannibal Corpse. The Sceptre of Deception Falconer. Possessed 13 Deluxe Edition The Crown. The Puppet Master King Diamond.
Bringer of Blood Six Feet Under. Worm Infested Cannibal Corpse. Unhallowed The Black Dahlia Murder. Into the Lungs of Hell God Dethroned. Nothing to Remember 40 Grit. Versus the World Amon Amarth. To Serve Man Cattle Decapitation. Crowned in Terror The Crown. Chapters from a Vale Forlorn Falconer.
Gore Obsessed Cannibal Corpse. Honour Valour Pride Bolt Thrower. Soulskinner Fleshcrawl. Imrama Primordial. Storm Before Calm Primordial. True Carnage Six Feet Under. Nod to the Old School Armored Saint. Falconer Falconer. The Crusher Amon Amarth. Ravenous God Dethroned. Close to a World Below Immolation. Graveyard Classics Six Feet Under. Spirit the Earth Aflame Primordial.
Deal with the Devil Lizzy Borden. Live Cannibalism Cannibal Corpse. Heads 40 Grit. Disconnected Fates Warning.
House of God King Diamond. Deathrace King The Crown. Revelation Armored Saint. The Avenger Amon Amarth. Bloodthirst Cannibal Corpse. Maximum Violence Six Feet Under. Bloody Blasphemy God Dethroned. Failures for Gods Immolation. Hell Is Here The Crown. Mercenary Bolt Thrower.
Still Life Fates Warning. A Journey's End Primordial. Dead Again Mercyful Fate. I also agree to receive email newsletters, account updates, notifications and communications from other profiles, sent by germanydating. A must-read for English-speaking expatriates and internationals across Europe, Expatica provides a tailored local news service and essential information on living, working, and moving to your country of choice. With in-depth features, Expatica brings the international community closer together.
Amongst other services, Expatica offers the best dating site for Expats in Germany since Finding love is a challenging quest even in your home country. Dating in Germany will either make it more so or raise the chance to finally get the partner you've been looking for all along.
0コメント